Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present a new cryptographic voting protocol for remote electronic voting that offers three of the most challenging features of such protocols: verifiability, everlasting privacy, and receipt-freeness. Trusted authorities and computational assumptions are only needed during vote casting and tallying to prevent the creation of invalid ballots and to achieve receipt-freeness and fairness, but not to guarantee vote privacy. The implementation of everlasting privacy is based on perfectly hiding commitments and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, whereas receipt-freeness is realized with mix networks and homomorphic tallying. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1007/s12243-016-0519-6 | Annales des Télécommunications |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Verifiable elections, Everlasting privacy, Receipt-freeness, Zero-knowledge proofs | Homomorphic encryption,Internet privacy,Electronic voting,Voting,Computer security,Cryptography,Receipt,Mathematical proof,Information privacy,Zero-knowledge proof,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
71 | 7-8 | 1958-9395 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.37 | 28 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Philipp Locher | 1 | 16 | 4.12 |
| Rolf Haenni | 2 | 371 | 33.39 |