Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•We study the capacity allocation game between duopolistic airlines which could offer callable products.•When the low-fare customers do not overflow, offering callable products is a dominant strategy and provides Pareto gains.•Offering callable products may be detrimental to the airlines.•The booking limits of the two airlines with callable products are higher than those without callable products.•We compare the booking limits under competition with those under monopoly. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.04.054 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Revenue management,Allocation game,Demand uncertainty,Callable products,Duopoly | Revenue,Revenue management,Duopoly,Microeconomics,Strategic dominance,Monopolistic competition,Callable bond,Mathematics,Pareto principle | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
254 | 3 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.38 | 14 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tingting Li | 1 | 5 | 1.09 |
| Jinxing Xie | 2 | 285 | 21.29 |
| Sheng-Min Lu | 3 | 3 | 0.38 |
| Jiafu Tang | 4 | 541 | 49.29 |