Title
On the Convergence of Piecewise Linear Strategic Interaction Dynamics on Networks.
Abstract
We prove that the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions are asymptotically convergent to their set of equilibria on any weighted undirected graph. We study various features of these dynamical systems, including the uniqueness and abundance properties of the set of equilibria and the emergence of unstable equilibria. We also introduce the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance on directed graphs, and demonstrate some of their interesting implications, including their correspondence to consensus and chromatic number of partite graphs. Examples illustrate our results.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1109/TAC.2015.2477975
IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.
Keywords
Field
DocType
Games,Trajectory,Convergence,Eigenvalues and eigenfunctions,Investment,Stability analysis,Asymptotic stability
Convergence (routing),Uniqueness,Mathematical optimization,Best response,Directed graph,Exponential stability,Dynamical systems theory,Equivalence (measure theory),Piecewise linear function,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
61
6
0018-9286
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.37
3
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bahman Gharesifard134026.54
Behrouz Touri217621.12
Tamer Basar33497402.11
Jeff S. Shamma41234153.33