Paper Info
Title
Rational Verification In Iterated Electric Boolean Games
Abstract
Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of rationality in electric boolean games with LTL objectives. In particular, we report that the problem of deciding whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium in an iterated electric boolean game is no harder than in iterated boolean games without resource bounds. We show that it is a PSPACE-complete problem. As a corollary, we obtain that both rational elimination and rational construction of Nash equilibria by a supervising authority are PSPACE-complete problems.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.4204/EPTCS.218.4
ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE
Field
DocType
Volume
Maximum satisfiability problem,Decision problem,Mathematical economics,Rationality,Nash equilibrium,Corollary,Iterated function,Mathematics
Journal
abs/1604.03773
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
218
2075-2180
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
14
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Youssouf Oualhadj1606.99
Nicolas Troquard226629.54