Paper Info
Title
Competition between regulation-providing and fixed-power charging stations for electric vehicles
Abstract
This paper models a non-cooperative game between two EV charging stations. One is a fixed-power charging station purchasing electricity from the grid at wholesale price and reselling the energy to EV owners at a higher retail price; the other is regulation-providing and varies the recharging power level of its clients to provide regulation services to the grid, so its profit comes from both EV owners (who buy energy) and the grid (which pays for regulation services). Users are reluctant to charging power variations and prefer shorter overall charging times, hence regulation-providing charging has to be cheaper than fixed-power charging. We analyze the competition among those charging providers, and examine the performance at the equilibrium in terms of user welfare, station revenue and electricity prices. As expected, competing stations provide users with lower charging prices than when both charging solutions are offered by a monopolistic provider. Moreover, while competition benefits users, it also benefits the grid in that the amount of regulation services increases significantly with respect to the monopolistic case.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1109/ISGTEurope.2016.7856223
2016 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe)
Keywords
DocType
Volume
electric vehicles charging stations,regulation-providing charging stations,fixed-power charging stations,noncooperative game,electricity purchasing,wholesale price,retail price,recharging power level,regulation services,power grid,charging providers,user welfare,station revenue,electricity prices,monopolistic provider
Conference
abs/1604.04579
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
2165-4816
978-1-5090-3359-1
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
5
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Wenjing Shuai1101.02
Patrick Maillé228243.33
Alexander Pelov3829.14