Paper Info
Title
Holding all the ASes: Identifying and Circumventing the Pitfalls of AS-aware Tor Client Design.
Abstract
Traffic correlation attacks to de-anonymize Tor users are possible when an adversary is in a position to observe traffic entering and exiting the Tor network. Recent work has brought attention to the threat of these attacks by network-level adversaries (e.g., Autonomous Systems). perform a historical analysis to understand how the threat from AS-level traffic correlation attacks has evolved over the past five years. find that despite a large number of new relays added to the Tor network, the threat has grown. This points to the importance of increasing AS-level diversity in addition to capacity of the Tor network. We identify and elaborate on common pitfalls of AS-aware Tor client design and construction. find that succumbing to these pitfalls can negatively impact three major aspects of an AS-aware Tor client -- (1) security against AS-level adversaries, (2) security against relay-level adversaries, and (3) performance. Finally, we propose and evaluate a Tor client -- Cipollino -- which avoids these pitfalls using state-of-the-art in network-measurement. Our evaluation shows that Cipollino is able to achieve better security against network-level adversaries while maintaining security against relay-level adversaries and
Year
Venue
Field
2016
arXiv: Cryptography and Security
Computer science,Computer security,Autonomous system (Internet),Adversary,Correlation attack
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1605.03596
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.38
17
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Rishab Nithyanand124216.39
Rachee Singh2234.54
Shinyoung Cho3142.31
Phillipa Gill41504114.56