Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of argumentsand a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way toevaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the prob-lem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of argumentsshould be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logicallyconsistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategicmanipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about whatthe outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introducedargument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategyproofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight funda-mental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand,and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigationinto the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results arealso relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria thatare considered more important, as well as the nature of agents’ preferences. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2016 | Journal of Logic and Computation | Graph,Social choice theory,Argumentation theory,Algorithm,Judgment aggregation,Operator (computer programming),Knowledge base,Pareto principle,Mathematics |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1604.00693 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 16 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edmond Awad | 1 | 21 | 4.93 |
| Martin W. A. Caminada | 2 | 865 | 46.84 |
| Gabriella Pigozzi | 3 | 363 | 30.06 |
| Mikolaj Podlaszewski | 4 | 55 | 3.84 |
| Iyad Rahwan | 5 | 1346 | 90.64 |