Abstract | ||
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Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2017 | 10.1007/s00182-016-0535-9 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Characterizing solution concepts, Common knowledge of rationality, Sequential equilibrium, Perfect equilibrium, Quasi-perfect equilibrium | Journal | abs/1605.01236 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 1432-1270 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 9 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Joseph Y. Halpern | 1 | 9617 | 1618.10 |
Yoram Moses | 2 | 2120 | 417.71 |