Title
Characterizing Solution Concepts in Terms of Common Knowledge of Rationality.
Abstract
Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/s00182-016-0535-9
Int. J. Game Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Characterizing solution concepts, Common knowledge of rationality, Sequential equilibrium, Perfect equilibrium, Quasi-perfect equilibrium
Journal
abs/1605.01236
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
1432-1270
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
9
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Joseph Y. Halpern196171618.10
Yoram Moses22120417.71