Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we study the problem of posting take-it-or-leave-it prices for a perishable item to maximize the selleru0027s expected revenue. Agents arrive independently over time, and each of them makes a purchase decision according to the price. We study the case that the seller has no prior information about agentsu0027 valuations, whereas the benchmark in the competitive analysis is an optimal mechanism that knows the value distribution. We propose a mechanism Γ1 which obtains constant competitive ratios under various valuation models. We also conduct numerical simulations and validate the empirical performance of Γ1. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.5555/2936924.2937138 | AAMAS |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Revenue,Revenue maximization,Optimal mechanism,Computer science,Operations research,Artificial intelligence,Valuation (finance),Machine learning,Competitive analysis | Conference | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 1 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bo Zheng | 1 | 5 | 1.77 |
| Li Xiao | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Guang Yang | 3 | 17 | 3.33 |
| Tao Qin | 4 | 2384 | 147.25 |