Paper Info
Title
Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange.
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the popular proportional sharing mechanism and discuss the incentives and opportunities of an agent to lie for personal gains in resource exchange game. The main result is a proof that an agent manipulating the proportional sharing mechanism by misreporting its resource amount will not benefit its own utility eventually. This result establishes a strategic stability property of the resource exchange protocol. We further illustrate and confirm the result via network examples.
Year
Venue
Field
2016
IJCAI
Incentive,Computer science,Microeconomics,Knowledge management,Proportional sharing,Artificial intelligence,Machine learning
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Conference
5
0.46
References 
Authors
13
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yukun Cheng15712.12
Xiaotie Deng23887340.99
Qi Qi3174.87
Xiang Yan46617.39