Title
Facility Location Games with Optional Preference.
Abstract
In this paper, we propose the optional preference model for the facility location game with two heterogeneous facilities on a line. Agents in this new model are allowed to have optional preference, which gives more flexibility for agents to report. Aiming at minimizing maximum cost or sum cost of agents, we propose different deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms without monetary transfers. Depending on which facility the agent with optional preference cares for, we consider two variants of the optional preference model: Min (caring for the closer one) and Max (caring for the further one). For the Min variant, we propose a 2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost objective, as well as a lower bound of 4/3, and a (n/2+1)-approximation mechanism for the sum cost objective, as well as a lower bound of 2. For Max variant, we propose an optimal mechanism for the maximum cost objective and a 2-approximation mechanism for the sum cost objective.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1520
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Field
DocType
Volume
Mathematical optimization,Optimal mechanism,Upper and lower bounds,Computer science,Facility location problem
Conference
285
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0922-6389
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hongning Yuan100.34
Kai Wang21734195.03
Ken C. K. Fong321.75
Yong Zhang46810.51
Minming Li582182.16