Paper Info
Title
Incentivizing Spectrum Sensing In Database-Driven Dynamic Spectrum Sharing
Abstract
The legacy concept of exclusion zones (EZs) is inept at enabling efficient utilization of fallow spectrum by secondary users (SUs), since legacy EZs are static and overly-conservative. The notion of a static EZ implies that it has to protect incumbent users (IUs) from the union of likely interference scenarios, leading to a worst-case, conservative solution. In this paper, we propose the concept of dynamic, multi-tier EZs, which takes advantage of participatory spectrum sensing carried out by SUs to support efficient database-driven spectrum sharing while protecting IUs against SU-induced aggregate interference. Specifically, the database directly incentivizes SUs to participate in spectrum sensing, which augments geolocation database by defining smaller EZs with dynamic boundaries and creating additional spectrum access opportunities for SUs. We propose an incentive mechanism based on a two-level game-theoretic model, in which the database conducts dynamic pricing in a first-level Stackelberg game in the presence of SUs who strategically contribute to spectrum sensing in a second-level stochastic game. The existence of an equilibrium solution is proven. According to our findings, the proposed incentive mechanism for the concept of dynamic, multitier EZs is effective to improve spectrum utilization efficiency while guaranteeing incumbent protection.
Year
Venue
Field
2016
IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - THE 35TH ANNUAL IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS
Incentive,Dynamic pricing,Computer science,Geolocation,Computer network,Interference (wave propagation),Spectrum sharing,Stackelberg competition,Database,Stochastic game
DocType
ISSN
Citations 
Conference
0743-166X
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.38
12
7
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bo Gao111814.53
Sudeep Bhattarai2666.31
Jung-Min Park3169098.77
Yaling Yang412214.11
Min Liu533540.49
Kexiong Zeng6234.70
Yanzhi Dou7194.64