Abstract | ||
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There has been a proliferation of public Wi-Fi hotspots that serve a significant amount of global mobile traffic today. In this paper, we propose a general Wi-Fi monetization model for public Wi-Fi hotspots deployed by venue owners (VOs), where VOs generate revenue from providing both the premium Wi-Fi access and the advertising sponsored Wi-Fi access to mobile users (MUs). With the premium access, MUs directly pay VOs for their Wi-Fi usage; while with the advertising sponsored access, MUs watch advertisements for the free usage of Wi-Fi. VOs sell their ad spaces to advertisers (ADs) via an ad platform, and share a proportion of the revenue with the ad platform. We formulate the economic interactions among the ad platform, VOs, MUs, and ADs as a three-stage Stackelberg game. By analyzing the equilibrium, we show that the ad platform's advertising revenue sharing policy affects a VO's Wi-Fi price but not the VO's advertising price. Moreover, we prove that a single term called equilibrium indicator determines whether a VO will fully rely on the premium access, or fully rely on the advertising sponsored access, or obtain revenue from both types of access. Numerical results show that the VO obtains a large revenue under a large advertising concentration level and a medium MU visiting frequency. © 2016 IEEE. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2016 | 10.1109/INFOCOM.2016.7524558 | Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Revenue,Revenue sharing,Telecommunications,Advertising,Mobile traffic,Monetization,Stackelberg competition,Business | Conference | 2016-July |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0743-166X | 2 | 0.38 |
References | Authors | |
6 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Haoran Yu | 1 | 39 | 10.34 |
Man Hon Cheung | 2 | 342 | 21.02 |
Lin Gao | 3 | 427 | 21.64 |
Jianwei Huang | 4 | 3643 | 260.73 |