Title
C-2 : Truthful Incentive Mechanism For Multiple Cooperative Tasks In Mobile Cloud
Abstract
In the practical crowdsourcing systems, there exist many cooperative tasks, each of which requires a group of users to perform together, such as finding the shortest multi-hop path or obtaining the media resources from a set of hosts. In this paper, we tackle the problem of how to truthfully and fairly schedule or allocate sufficient users who join mobile crowdsourcing applications with their smartphones. Moreover, the cooperation among users is taken into account. Thus, we present a novel Cooperative Crowdsourcing (C-2) auction mechanism for crowdsourcing multiple cooperative tasks. C-2 contains two parts: user selection and payment computation. In the first part, we first prove that users selection with the minimum social cost is NP hard problem and design a greedy algorithm to achieve near-optimal solution in polynomial time. The other part is that the server determines the payments of selected users to avoid the bidder's cheating behavior through a pricing algorithm that if and only if users honestly bid their cost, they can obtain the maximum utility. Both theoretical analysis and extensive simulations demonstrate that C-2 auction achieves not only truthfulness, individual rationality and high computational efficiency, but also low overpayment ratio.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1109/ICC.2016.7511052
2016 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC)
Field
DocType
ISSN
Algorithm design,Crowdsourcing,Computer science,Server,Computer network,Greedy algorithm,Cheating,Time complexity,Payment,Mobile telephony,Distributed computing
Conference
1550-3607
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
5
0.41
7
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Shuyun Luo1263.85
Yongmei Sun27713.66
Zhenyu Wen3957.51
Yuefeng Ji430349.02