Title
On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games.
Abstract
In this paper we solve the inverse problem for each linear, symmetric, efficient and regular value (or LSER value for short). That is, given a payoff vector and a LSER value, we find all TU games such that LSER value for them is equal to the given payoff vector. Also, we characterize those linear, symmetric and efficient values that further satisfy the inessential game property.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1016/j.orl.2016.07.009
Oper. Res. Lett.
Keywords
Field
DocType
The linear, symmetric and efficient value,The inverse problem,The null space of a linear operator
Combinatorics,Mathematical optimization,Subclass,Inverse problem,Mathematics,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
44
5
0167-6377
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.36
7
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jony Rojas Rojas110.36
Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez210.36