Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We investigate the problem of mechanism design for wind energy procurement. We consider a dynamic two-step model with one strategic buyer and one strategic seller with wind generation. The seller has private information about his technology and wind condition, which he learns dynamically over time. We consider (static) forward and real-time mechanisms for energy procurement that take place at time T=1 and T=2, respectively. We also propose a set of dynamic mechanisms that provide a coupling between real-time and forward markets over time. We show that the dynamic mechanisms outperform the real-time and forward mechanisms, thus, we demonstrate the advantage of adopting dynamic mechanisms over static mechanisms for wind energy procurement. Furthermore, we characterize the effect of wind monitoring and penalty risk on the selleru0027s revenue and the buyeru0027s utility. We illustrate our results with a numerical example. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2016 | arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory | Revenue,Mathematical optimization,Microeconomics,Operations research,Mechanism design,Procurement,Private information retrieval,Mathematics,Wind power |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1608.04143 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 4 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hamidreza Tavafoghi | 1 | 15 | 5.93 |
| Demosthenis Teneketzis | 2 | 612 | 85.73 |