Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This article studies estimation of social interactions in a large network game, where all observations come from one single equilibrium of a network game with asymmetric information. Simple assumptions about the structure are made to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium strategies satisfy a network decaying dependence condition requiring that dependence between two playersu0027 decisions decay with their network distance, which serves as the basis for my statistical inference. Moreover, I establish identification and propose a computationally feasible and efficient estimation method, which is illustrated by an empirical application of college attendance. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1111/iere.12269 | International Economic Review |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Econometrics,Uniqueness,Large networks,Mathematical optimization,Information asymmetry,Social network,Game theoretic,Equilibrium selection,Statistical inference,Bayesian game,Mathematics | Journal | abs/1610.08903 |
Issue | Citations | PageRank |
1 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 1 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haiqing Xu | 1 | 4 | 1.84 |