Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The website fingerprinting attack aims to infer the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by analyzing patterns from the communication such as packet sizes, their order, and direction. Although recent study has shown that no existing fingerprinting method scales in Tor when applied in realistic settings, this does not consider the case of Tor hidden services. In this work, we propose a two-phase fingerprinting approach applied in the scope of Tor hidden services and explore its scalability. We show that the success of the only previously proposed fingerprinting attack against hidden services strongly depends on the Tor version used; i.e., it may be applicable to less than 1.5% of connections to hidden services due to its requirement for control of the first anonymization node. In contrast, in our method, the attacker needs merely to be somewhere on the link between the client and the first anonymization node and the attack can be mounted for any connection to a hidden service. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1145/2976749.2989054 | ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Tor Hidden Services, Website Fingerprinting, Privacy | Internet privacy,Computer security,Computer science,Network packet,Encryption,Scalability | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.35 | 4 |
Authors | ||
6 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asya Mitseva | 1 | 9 | 3.25 |
| Andriy Panchenko | 2 | 309 | 23.05 |
| Fabian Lanze | 3 | 52 | 4.66 |
| Martin Henze | 4 | 295 | 24.86 |
| Klaus Wehrle | 5 | 1062 | 105.97 |
| Thomas Engel | 6 | 455 | 42.34 |