Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed value (alpha ). Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online sequence and are not known in advance. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2016 | COCOA | Discrete mathematics,Online algorithm,Graph,Closest facility,Computer science,Operations research,Algorithmic game theory,Facility location problem,Competitive analysis,Bounded function |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 1 | 0.36 |
References | Authors | |
5 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maximilian Drees | 1 | 7 | 1.89 |
| Björn Feldkord | 2 | 2 | 1.39 |
| Alexander Skopalik | 3 | 247 | 20.62 |