Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best informed player” would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2016 | Games | Welfare economics,Revenue,Mathematical economics,Economics,Rationality,Combinatorial auction,Microeconomics,Probabilistic logic,Solution concept,Complete information,Extensive-form game,Collusion |
DocType | Volume | Issue |
Journal | 7 | 4 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jing Chen | 1 | 12 | 2.39 |
| Silvio Micali | 2 | 11434 | 2581.31 |