Paper Info
Title
Strongly secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols without bilinear pairings.
Abstract
In this paper, we present two strongly secure pairing-free identity-based (ID-based) two-party authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols achieving implicit authentication, which are proven secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. The proposals can offer provable security against both passive and active adversaries in the random oracle model. Our schemes capture all basic desirable security properties including key-compromise impersonation resilience, ephemeral secrets reveal resistance, (weak) perfect forward secrecy and master key forward secrecy etc. We show the security of one of these proposals can be reduced to the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the security of the other relies on the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption while having a lower computational overhead. Currently, there are few pairing-free ID-based AKA protocols that are provably secure in such strong security models as the eCK model. Our schemes can provide strong security assurances and in the meanwhile achieve a good computational efficiency. Compared with previous related schemes, our protocols have advantages over them in security, efficiency or both.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1016/j.ins.2016.05.015
Inf. Sci.
Keywords
Field
DocType
Authenticated key agreement,Identity-based cryptography,Provable security,Diffie–Hellman assumption,The extended Canetti–Krawczyk model
Computational hardness assumption,Overhead (computing),Authentication,Computer science,Computer security,Random oracle,Forward secrecy,Computer security model,Provable security,Bilinear interpolation
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
367-368
C
0020-0255
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.38
0
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Liang Ni1562.09
Gong-Liang Chen216013.54
Jianhua Li3203.19
Yanyan Hao4451.50