Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national, regional or hospital frameworks, to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted. For the case of hospital programs, it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other, sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals. This claim led to the study of multi-hospital exchange markets. We propose a novel direction in this setting by modeling the exchange market as an integer programming game. The analysis of the strategic behavior of the entities participating in the kidney exchange game allowed us to prove that the most rational game outcome maximizes the social welfare and that it can be computed in polynomial time. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1007/s10107-016-1013-7 | Math. Program. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Kidney exchange, Nash equilibrium, Social welfare, Matching, 91A80, 05C85, 90C27 | Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Actuarial science,Strategic behavior,Integer programming,Time complexity,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics,Social Welfare | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
161 | 1-2 | 1436-4646 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 8 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Margarida Carvalho | 1 | 29 | 5.34 |
| Andrea Lodi | 2 | 2198 | 152.51 |
| João Pedro Pedroso | 3 | 183 | 17.09 |
| Ana Viana | 4 | 44 | 3.77 |