Abstract | ||
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Motivated by a recent new type of randomized Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the Domain Name Service (DNS), we develop novel and efficient distinct heavy hitters algorithms and build an attack identification system that uses our algorithms. Heavy hitter detection in streams is a fundamental problem with many applications, including detecting certain DDoS attacks and anomalies. A (classic) heavy hitter (HH) in a stream of elements is a key (e.g., the domain of a query) which appears in many elements (e.g., requests). When stream elements consist of a pairs, ( ) a distinct heavy hitter (dhh) is a key that is paired with a large number of different subkeys. Our dHH algorithms are considerably more practical than previous algorithms. Specifically the new fixed-size algorithms are simple to code and with asymptotically optimal space accuracy tradeoffs. In addition we introduce a new measure, a combined heavy hitter (cHH), which is a key with a large combination of distinct and classic weights. Efficient algorithms are also presented for cHH detection. Finally, we perform extensive experimental evaluation on real DNS attack traces, demonstrating the effectiveness of both our algorithms and our DNS malicious queries identification system. |
Year | Venue | Field |
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2016 | arXiv: Cryptography and Security | Denial-of-service attack,Computer science,Computer security,Identification system,Domain Name System,Computer network,Theoretical computer science,Asymptotically optimal algorithm,DNS spoofing |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1612.02636 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Yehuda Afek | 1 | 1840 | 176.95 |
Anat Bremler-Barr | 2 | 505 | 39.95 |
Edith Cohen | 3 | 3260 | 268.21 |
Shir Landau Feibish | 4 | 37 | 5.78 |
Michal Shagam | 5 | 0 | 0.68 |