Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider a system in which a group of agents represented by the vertices of a graph synchronously update their opinion based on that of their neighbours. If each agent adopts a positive opinion if and only if that opinion is sufficiently popular among his neighbours, the system will eventually settle into a fixed state or alternate between two states. If one agent acts in a different way, other periods may arise. We show that only a small number of periods may arise if natural restrictions are placed either on the neighbourhood structure or on the way in which the nonconforming agent may act; without either of these restrictions any period is possible. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1016/j.dam.2016.12.004 | Discrete Applied Mathematics |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Majority dynamics,Threshold automata,Voter model,Social learning,Periodicity | Small number,Discrete mathematics,Graph,Combinatorics,Vertex (geometry),Nonconformist,Neighbourhood (mathematics),Voter model,Social learning,If and only if,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
219 | C | 0166-218X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.36 | 5 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Haslegrave | 1 | 29 | 5.74 |
| Chris Cannings | 2 | 1 | 1.04 |