Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
With the explosive development of social networks, users' behaviors are prone to be socially connected. Social Network Operator (SNO) can effectively collect communication data which reflects users' social behaviors and construct a social graph which precisely characterize relationship among users. Users who exert online influence on their friends can potentially affect their friends' demand for wireless service. Therefore, the knowledge of users' influence would help Wireless Network Operator (WNO) make optimal operating decisions to maximize profit. This paper focus on the optimal pricing strategy of WNO when users' social influence is taken into consideration. We model SNO and WNO's relationship as a cooperative game. By formulating the interaction between SNO-WNO's coalition and users as a two-stage Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing strategy is derived which brings about extra profits. Moreover, we propose a generalized bargaining scheme based on contribution factor to divide extra profits between operators. Simulation results reveal the fact that wireless network operator's possession of influence information does incur extra profits. In addition, feasibility of SNO and WNO's cooperation is validated. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2016 | IEEE Global Communications Conference | Wireless network,Wireless,Social graph,Social network,Computer science,Computer network,Social influence,Operator (computer programming),Wireless ad hoc network,Stackelberg competition |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | 2334-0983 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wenjie Bai | 1 | 0 | 1.01 |
| Xiaoying Gan | 2 | 344 | 48.16 |
| Xinbing Wang | 3 | 2642 | 214.43 |
| Xin Di | 4 | 3 | 1.38 |
| Jun Tian | 5 | 11 | 2.99 |