Paper Info
Title
Designing Socially-Optimal Rating Protocols for Crowdsourcing Contest Dilemma
Abstract
Despite the increasing popularity and the perceived promise of crowdsourcing, its openness presents individuals with an opportunity to exhibit antisocial behavior, such as free-ride and attack to decrease the social welfare, which is considered as a crowdsourcing contest dilemma. Hence, incentive mechanisms are needed to compel rational and selfish individuals to contribute well behavior in tasks. In this paper, we integrate the pricing and reputation schemes to design a novel socially optimal rating protocol based on game theory, in which each player is tagged with a rating to represent its social status, and players are encouraged to contribute good behaviors to increase their ratings, thus receive higher rewards. In particular, we analyze how the players' behaviors are influenced by the incurred costs and the designed payment, as well as their long-term utilities. By quantifying the sufficient and necessary conditions under which all players comply with the social norm in their self-interests, we formulate the rating protocol design problem, and analyze the impacts of the design parameters in order to characterize the optimal design, that maximizes the social welfare to achieve the social optimum. Finally, illustrative results show the validity and effectiveness of our proposed protocol design for crowdsourcing contest dilemma.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1109/TIFS.2017.2656468
IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security
Keywords
Field
DocType
Crowdsourcing,Protocols,Games,Pricing,Monitoring,Analytical models,Game theory
Incentive,Crowdsourcing,Computer security,Computer science,Microeconomics,Norm (social),Artificial intelligence,Dilemma,Reputation,Pattern recognition,CONTEST,Game theory,Social Welfare
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
12
6
1556-6013
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
7
0.43
22
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jianfeng Lu1267.61
Changbing Tang2368.07
Xiang Li38140.11
Qian Wu42812.34