Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Multifirm models of cybersecurity investment competition vs. cooperation and network vulnerability. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•Developed three models for cybersecurity investment in competitive and cooperative situations.•Firms heterogeneous in their preferences and incurred costs in case of cyberattack.•Nash bargaining theory utilized to argue for information sharing and quantification of benefits.•Quantification of monetary and security benefits in terms of reduction in network vulnerability.•Models compared to recommend a course of action. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.034 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Cybersecurity,Investments,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Nash bargaining | Uniqueness,Economics,Computer security,Financial services,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Information sharing,Vulnerability,Variational inequality,Bargaining problem | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
260 | 2 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
6 | 0.53 | 11 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anna Nagurney | 1 | 677 | 96.18 |
| Shivani Shukla | 2 | 18 | 1.18 |