Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the egalitarian Shapley values. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
An -egalitarian Shapley value is the convex combination of the Shapley value and the equal division value in terms of a social selfish coefficient [0,1] reconciling the two polar opinions of marginalism and egalitarianism. We present a procedural interpretation for every egalitarian Shapley value. We also characterize each -egalitarian Shapley value by associated consistency, continuity and the -dummy player property. The Jordan normal form approach is applied as the pivotal technique to accomplish the most important proof. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.012 | Oper. Res. Lett. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Cooperative game,Egalitarian Shapley value,Associated consistency,α-dummy player property,Jordan normal form | Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Convex combination,Shapley value,Egalitarianism,Jordan normal form,Mathematics,Marginalism | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
45 | 2 | 0167-6377 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.47 | 5 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wenna Wang | 1 | 3 | 0.81 |
| Hao Sun | 2 | 31 | 10.18 |
| Genjiu Xu | 3 | 30 | 7.31 |
| Dongshuang Hou | 4 | 11 | 6.27 |