Title
Harsanyi Power Solutions in Coalitional Control Systems.
Abstract
In coalitional control the connections among the different parts of a control network evolve dynamically to achieve a trade-off between communication burden and control performance, and the coalition choices are made by selecting the network topology with minimal payoff. This work analyzes how Harsanyi power solutions for games in coalitional control schemes, which generalize the Shapley value in this context, can be used to quantify the value of the communication links under different control topologies. To this end, a game among these links is considered, and the payoff that each link receives is determined by the Harsanyi power solutions, which take into account the communication costs and the predicted infinite-horizon costs for these topologies. The concept of link power measure as a centrality index to configure the communication costs is also introduced. As a result, a more computationally efficient design method with respect to previous works has been proposed.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1109/TAC.2017.2651642
IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.
Keywords
Field
DocType
Network topology,Topology,Games,Context,Power measurement,Resource management,Cost function
Resource management,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Shapley value,Centrality,Network topology,Control network,Control system,Mathematics,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
62
7
0018-9286
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
20
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Muros, F.J.1113.70
Encarnación Algaba Durán2799.14
Jose Maria Maestre33214.98
Eduardo F. Camacho416925.28