Paper Info
Title
Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem.
Abstract
We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness in the context of the queueing problem. First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which requires that each agent should be guaranteed her utility at the kth queue position with zero transfer. For each k, we show that the k-pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, 2011) achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the k-welfare lower bound. Next, we consider the identical costs lower bound, which is a counterpart of the identical preferences lower bound in our context, and show that when there is an odd number of agents, the k-pivotal rules with k=n+12 achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the identical costs lower bound. Our results provide an alternative justification for the k-pivotal rules.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
C72,D63,D71,D82
Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Upper and lower bounds,Queue,Queueing theory,Welfare,Parity (mathematics),Mathematics
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
102
0899-8256
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
6
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Youngsub Chun19420.80
Duygu Yengin2192.91