Title
On the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy: Is selfish routing bad in highly congested networks?
Abstract
This paper examines the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the total traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination pairs. We first show that the price of anarchy may remain bounded away from 1, even in simple three-link parallel networks with convex cost functions. On the other hand, empirical studies show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in highly congested real-world networks, thus begging the question: under what assumptions can this behavior be justified analytically? To that end, we prove a general result showing that for a large class of cost functions (defined in terms of regular variation and including all polynomials), the price of anarchy converges to 1 in the high congestion limit. In particular, specializing to networks with polynomial costs, we show that this convergence follows a power law whose degree can be computed explicitly.
Year
Venue
Field
2017
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory
Convergence (routing),Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Polynomial,Price of stability,Regular polygon,Price of anarchy,Asymptotic analysis,Empirical research,Mathematics,Bounded function
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1703.00927
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi1429.30
R. Cominetti215922.44
Panayotis Mertikopoulos325843.71
Marco Scarsini416433.96