Paper Info
Title
An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index.
Abstract
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index for the case where issues are elements of two-dimensional space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition, which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected to unanimity games. The other axioms include two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial positions of the players, besides spatial versions of anonymity and dummy. The last condition says that dummy players can be left out in a specific way without changing the power of the other players. We show that this condition can be weakened to requiring dummies to have zero power if we add a condition of positional continuity. We also show that the axioms in our characterization(s) are logically independent.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/s00182-016-0544-8
Int. J. Game Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
Simple game, Constellation, Spatial game, Owen–Shapley spatial power index, C71, D72
Unanimity,Mathematical economics,Axiom,Constellation,Anonymity,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
46
2
1432-1270
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
8
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hans Peters13921.55
José M. Zarzuelo29822.79