Paper Info
Title
Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions.
Abstract
In this paper we introduce a game-theoretic model for reward functions in Bitcoin mining pools. Our model consists only of an unordered history of reported shares and gives participating miners the strategy choices of either reporting or delaying when they discover a share or full solution. We defined a precise condition for incentive compatibility to ensure miners strategy choices optimize the welfare of the pool as a whole. With this definition we show that proportional mining rewards are not incentive compatible in this model. We introduce and analyze a novel reward function which is incentive compatible in this model. Finally we show that the popular reward function pay-per-last-N-shares is also incentive compatible in a more general model.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_28
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Field
DocType
Volume
Internet privacy,Incentive compatibility,A share,Computer security,Computer science,Welfare
Conference
9603
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
5
0.46
References 
Authors
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Okke Schrijvers1354.88
Joseph Bonneau2179292.19
Dan Boneh3212541398.98
Tim Roughgarden44177353.32