Paper Info
Title
Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies.
Abstract
Classical voting rules output a winning alternative (or a nonempty set of tied alternatives). Social welfare functions output a ranking over alternatives. There are many practical situations where we have to output a different structure than a winner or a ranking: for instance, a ranked or non-ranked set of $k$ winning alternatives, or an ordered partition of alternatives. We define three classes of such aggregation functions, whose output can have any structure we want; we focus on aggregation functions that output dominating chains, dominating subsets, and dichotomies. We address the computation of our rules, and start studying their normative properties by focusing on a generalisation of Condorcet-consistency.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.5555/3091125.3091135
AAMAS
Field
DocType
Citations 
Data mining,Computer science,Artificial intelligence,Computation,Graph theory,Aggregation problem,Mathematical economics,Dichotomy,Ranking,Voting,Generalization,Partition (number theory),Machine learning
Conference
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
9
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jérôme Lang12838260.90
Jérôme Monnot251255.74
Arkadii Slinko341039.12
William S. Zwicker49615.67