Paper Info
Title
Practical versus Optimal Mechanisms.
Abstract
Designing simple mechanisms with desirable revenue guarantees has become a major research agenda in the economics and computation community. However, few mechanisms have been actually applied in industry. In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between the \"simple versus optimal\" theory and practice, and propose a class of parameterized mechanisms, tailored for the sponsored search auction settings. Our mechanisms can balance different objectives by simple parameter tuning, yet at the same time guarantee near optimal revenue in both theoretical and practical senses.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.5555/3091125.3091142
AAMAS
Keywords
Field
DocType
auction,revenue maximization,sponsored search,applied mechanism design
Sponsored search auction,Revenue,Parameterized complexity,Revenue maximization,Computer science,Operations research,Auction theory,Management science,Computation,Distributed computing
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
15
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Weiran Shen158.25
Pingzhong Tang213332.06