Title
Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.
Abstract
In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2019
COCOON
Congestion games, Pure Nash equilibrium, Existence, Convergence, Complexity, Approximation
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Journal
0
0.34
References 
Authors
6
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Maximilian Drees171.89
Matthias Feldotto2145.50
Sören Riechers3155.12
Alexander Skopalik424720.62