Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present a two player gradient play differential game in a producer market with quadratic payoff as a model of behavior in a competitive environment and show that the Nash equilibrium is not efficient. An algorithm is then presented which uses side payments to induce cooperation between firms, and rules for side payment strategies are shown. The stability of the new system at a reasonable equilibrium is proved, and it is shown that all participants are at least as well off as they would be at the non-cooperative equilibrium. Numerical examples show the existence of a reasonable equilibrium and that the basin of attraction of that equilibrium appears to cover all reasonable initial conditions. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 2017 AMERICAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (ACC) | cooperation, game theory |
Field | DocType | ISSN |
Sequential equilibrium,Correlated equilibrium,Mathematical economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Risk dominance,Computer science,Repeated game,Equilibrium selection,Symmetric equilibrium,Nash equilibrium | Conference | 0743-1619 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 2 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Winston Hurst | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Sean Warnick | 2 | 198 | 25.76 |