Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Commercial advertisement dissemination is one of the most promising applications in self-organizing mobile social networks (SMSN). Lightweight incentives are essential to encourage the participation of mobile users, given that only a few users are voluntary due to limited resources in mobiles. However, existing incentives overlook dishonest behaviors of relays in overstating their costs for higher payments, which in turn can reduce the revenues and utilities of disseminators. To this end, we design a sealed-auction-based incentive named DIBS. Effective algorithms utilizing lightweight information in DIBS encourage users to provide truthful information and to spread ads in differential places, where competition is less as fewer users carry the same ads in the same areas. Moreover, we prove that DIBS possesses attractive properties theoretically for auction-based incentives, i.e., lightweight, truthfulness and individual rationality. Extensive simulation results on both real and synthetic traces verify that DIBS can improve revenues and utilities of disseminators, and achieve efficient ad dissemination. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2015 | ISCC | Mobile computing,Revenue,Social network,Rationality,Advertising,Incentive,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network,Payment,Mobile telephony |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 6 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xiao Chen | 1 | 4 | 1.11 |
| Min Liu | 2 | 335 | 40.49 |
| Yaqin Zhou | 3 | 24 | 4.25 |
| Zhongcheng Li | 4 | 83 | 12.63 |
| Shuang Chen | 5 | 6 | 1.46 |
| Xiangnan He | 6 | 3064 | 128.86 |