Paper Info
Title
An Angel-Daemon Approach to Assess the Uncertainty in the Power of a Collectivity to Act.
Abstract
We propose the use of the angel-daemon (a/d) framework to assess the Coleman's power of a collectivity to act under uncertainty in weighted voting games. In this framework uncertainty profiles describe the potential changes in the weights of a weighted game and fixes the spread of the weights' change. For each uncertainty profile a strategic a/d game can be considered. This game has two selfish players, the angel a and the daemon d, a selects its action as to maximize the effect on the measure under consideration while d acts oppositely. Players a and d give a balance between the best and the worst. The a/d games associated to the Coleman's power are zero-sum games and therefore the expected utilities of all the Nash equilibria are the same. In this way we can asses the Coleman's power under uncertainty. Besides introducing the framework for this particular setting we analyse basic properties and make some computational complexity considerations. We provide several examples based in the evolution of the voting rules of the EU Council of Ministers.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/978-3-319-61581-3_29
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
Keywords
Field
DocType
Weighted voting games,Coleman's power of a collectivity to act,Uncertainty profiles,Strategic games,Zero-sum games,EU Council of Ministers
Discrete mathematics,Voting,Computer science,Weighted voting,Zero-sum game,Nash equilibrium,Daemon,Computational complexity theory
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
10369
0302-9743
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
5
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Giulia Fragnito100.34
Joaquim Gabarró219728.76
Maria J. Serna347370.53