Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
A Stealth, Selective, Link-Layer Denial-of-Service Attack Against Automotive Networks. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Modern vehicles incorporate tens of electronic control units (ECUs), driven by as much as 100,000,000 lines of code. They are tightly interconnected via internal networks, mostly based on the CAN bus standard. Past research showed that, by obtaining physical access to the network or by remotely compromising a vulnerable ECU, an attacker could control even safety-critical inputs such as throttle, steering or brakes. In order to secure current CAN networks from cyberattacks, detection and prevention approaches based on the analysis of transmitted frames have been proposed, and are generally considered the most time- and cost-effective solution, to the point that companies have started promoting aftermarket products for existing vehicles. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2017 | DIMVA | CAN bus,Denial-of-service attack,Computer science,Computer network,Link layer,Cable harness,Throttle,Intrusion detection system,Source lines of code,Automotive industry |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 5 | 0.54 |
References | Authors | |
5 | 4 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Andrea Palanca | 1 | 5 | 0.54 |
| Eric Evenchick | 2 | 5 | 0.54 |
| Federico Maggi | 3 | 524 | 37.68 |
| Stefano Zanero | 4 | 736 | 53.78 |