Title
Modeling Multileader–Follower Noncooperative Stackelberg Games
Abstract
This paper presents a Stackelberg–Nash game for modeling multiple leaders and followers. The model involves two Nash games restricted by a Stackelberg game. We propose a computational approach to find the equilibrium point based on the extraproximal method for ergodic controlled finite Markov chains. The extraproximal method consists of a two-step iterated procedure: the first step is a prediction and the second is a basic adjustment of the previous step. We formulate the game as coupled nonlinear programming problems using the Lagrange principle. The Tikhonov’s regularization method is used to guarantee the convergence to a unique equilibrium point. Validity of the method is demonstrated applying this framework to model an oligopoly competition.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1080/01969722.2016.1232121
Cybernetics and Systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
Extraproximal method,Markov chains,multiple leader-follower,Nash,Stackelberg games
Tikhonov regularization,Convergence (routing),Mathematical optimization,Oligopoly,Nonlinear programming,Markov chain,Equilibrium point,Artificial intelligence,Stackelberg competition,Iterated function,Machine learning,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
47
8
0196-9722
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.43
7
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Cesar U. Solis191.93
Julio B. Clempner29120.11
Alexander S. Poznyak335863.68