Abstract | ||
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In this work, we investigate how to protect public key encryption from both key-leakage attacks and tampering attacks. First, we formalize the notions of chosen ciphertext (CCA) security against key-leakage and tampering attacks. To this goal, we then introduce the concept of key-homomorphic hash proof systems and present a generic construction of public key encryption based on this new primitive. Our construction, compared with previous works, realizes leakage-resilience and tampering-resilience simultaneously but completely independently, so it can tolerate a larger amount of bounded-memory leakage and be instantiated with more flexibility. Moreover, it allows for an unbounded number of affine-tampering queries, even after the challenge phase. With slight adaptations, our construction also achieves CCA security against subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage attacks and a polynomial of affine-tampering attacks. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we get the first public key encryption scheme secure against both auxiliary-input leakage attacks and tampering attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2017 | 10.1016/j.jcss.2017.03.004 | Journal of Computer and System Sciences |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Public key encryption,Hash proof system,Chosen-ciphertext security,Key-leakage attack,Tampering attack | Leakage (electronics),Computer security,Attribute-based encryption,Computer network,40-bit encryption,Probabilistic encryption,Hash function,Ciphertext,Public-key cryptography,56-bit encryption,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
89 | 0022-0000 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 29 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Shifeng Sun | 1 | 59 | 15.53 |
Dawu Gu | 2 | 644 | 103.50 |
Parampalli Udaya | 3 | 313 | 39.13 |
Yu Yu | 4 | 219 | 30.37 |
Baodong Qin | 5 | 190 | 19.40 |