Paper Info
Title
Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network.
Abstract
This article deals with object allocation where each agent receives a single item. Starting from an initial endowment, the agents can be better off by exchanging their objects. However, not all trades are likely because some participants are unable to communicate. By considering that the agents are embedded in a social network, we propose to study the allocations emerging from a sequence of simple swaps between pairs of neighbors in the network. This model raises natural questions regarding (i) the reachability of a given assignment, (ii) the ability of an agent to obtain a given object, and (iii) the search of Pareto-efficient allocations. We investigate the complexity of these problems by providing, according to the structure of the social network, polynomial and NP-complete cases.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.24963/ijcai.2017/31
IJCAI
Field
DocType
Citations 
Social choice theory,Social network,Endowment,Polynomial,Computer science,Reachability,Theoretical computer science,Artificial intelligence,Swap (finance),Machine learning
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
3
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Laurent Gourvès124130.97
Julien Lesca2468.51
Anaëlle Wilczynski313.07