Abstract | ||
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Peer review may be "single-blind," in which reviewers are aware of the names and affiliations of paper authors, or "double-blind," in which this information is hidden. Noting that computer science research often appears first or exclusively in peer-reviewed conferences rather than journals, we study these two reviewing models in the context of the 10th Association for Computing Machinery International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, a highly selective venue (15.6% acceptance rate) in which expert committee members review full-length submissions for acceptance. We present a controlled experiment in which four committee members review each paper. Two of these four reviewers are drawn from a pool of committee members with access to author information; the other two are drawn from a disjoint pool without such access. This information asymmetry persists through the process of bidding for papers, reviewing papers, and entering scores. Reviewers in the single-blind condition typically bid for 22% fewer papers and preferentially bid for papers from top universities and companies. Once papers are allocated to reviewers, single-blind reviewers are significantly more likely than their double-blind counterparts to recommend for acceptance papers from famous authors, top universities, and top companies. The estimated odds multipliers are tangible, at 1.63, 1.58, and 2.10, respectively. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2017 | 10.1073/pnas.1707323114 | PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
peer review, double-blind, scientific method | Information asymmetry,Public relations,Computer science,Acceptance rate,Controlled experiment,Odds,Bidding | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
114 | 48 | 0027-8424 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
13 | 1.63 | 9 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Andrew Tomkins | 1 | 9388 | 1401.23 |
Min Zhang | 2 | 1658 | 134.93 |
William D Heavlin | 3 | 13 | 1.97 |