Title
Possible and Necessary Allocations Under Serial Dictatorship with Incomplete Preference Lists.
Abstract
We study assignment problems in a model where agents have strict preferences over objects, allowing preference lists to be incomplete. We investigate the questions whether an agent can obtain or necessarily obtains a given object under serial dictatorship. We prove that both problems are computationally hard even if agents have preference lists of length at most 3; by contrast, we give linear-time algorithms for the case where preference lists are of length at most 2. We also study a capacitated version of these problems where objects come in several copies.
Year
Venue
Field
2017
ADT
Dictatorship,Mathematical economics,Mathematics
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Conference
0
0.34
References 
Authors
10
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Katarína Cechlárová122628.02
Tamás Fleiner224127.45
Ildikó Schlotter315712.49