Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study a dynamic mechanism design problem for a network of interdependent strategic agents with coupled dynamics. In contrast to the existing results for static settings, we present a dynamic mechanism that is incentive compatible, individually rational, budget balanced, and social welfare maximizing. We utilize the correlation among agents' states over time, and determine a set of inference signals for all agents that enable us to design a set of incentive payments that internalize the effect of each agent on the overall network dynamic status, and thus, align each agent's objective with the social objective. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8 | GAME THEORY FOR NETWORKS (GAMENETS 2017) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Security games, Dynamic mechanism design, Epidemics over networks | Interdependence,Economics,Incentive compatibility,Incentive,Inference,Microeconomics,Mechanism design,Industrial organization,Payment,Social Welfare | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
212 | 1867-8211 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 9 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Farzaneh Farhadi | 1 | 3 | 1.05 |
| Hamidreza Tavafoghi | 2 | 15 | 5.93 |
| Demosthenis Teneketzis | 3 | 612 | 85.73 |
| Jamal Golestani | 4 | 1 | 0.34 |