Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
AbstractWe investigate in a competitive setting the consequences of mobile geo targeting, the practice of firms targeting consumers based on their real-time locations. A distinct market feature of mobile geo targeting is that a consumer could travel across different locations for an offer that maximizes his total utility. This mobile-deal seeking opportunity motivates firms to carefully balance prices across locations to avoid intrafirm cannibalization, which in turn mitigates interfirm price competition and prevents firms from going into a prisoner's dilemma. As a result, a firm's profit can be higher under mobile geo targeting than under uniform or traditional targeted pricing. We extend our model in three different directions: a a fraction of consumers are not aware of mobile offers outside of their permanent locations, b mobile offers can be collected when consumers travel for other reasons, and c firms use both permanent and real-time locations when setting prices. Our findings have important managerial implications for marketers who are interested in optimizing their mobile geo-targeting strategies.The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1030. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1287/mksc.2017.1030 | Periodicals |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
targeted pricing,mobile targeting,geo targeting,analytical models | Economics,Cannibalization,Microeconomics,Dilemma,Marketing | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
36 | 5 | 1526-548X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.45 | 7 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yuxin Chen | 1 | 71 | 9.84 |
| Xinxin Li | 2 | 27 | 8.16 |
| Monic Sun | 3 | 49 | 3.64 |