Title
Fault analysis on Kalyna
Abstract
AbstractKalyna is a block cipher that has been selected as the result of the Ukrainian National Public Cryptographic Competition 2007–2010. Two important criteria for the selection of this new standard cipher were a high level of security and being able to work on modern platforms. After being selected, Kalyna has been slightly modified and approved as the new encryption standard in Ukraine in 2015. Kalyna has SPN Substitution-Permutation Network-based structure similar to AES Advanced Encryption Standard. However, Kalyna has four different sets of SBoxes, a totally different key scheduling compared to AES, and it utilizes modulo key addition in the beginning and at the end of its encryption operation. Kalyna has five different modes of operation. In this paper, we investigate two different fault attacks on Kalyna. In the first attack, we assume that the attacker knows everything about the cipher except its secret key. In the second case, we assume that the SBox entries are also kept secret from the attacker. In both cases, we show that fault analysis gives the attacker a small number of key candidates that can be brute-forced. Our results illustrate the importance of protecting implementations of Kalyna against fault analysis.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1080/19393555.2017.1371361
Periodicals
Keywords
Field
DocType
Cryptanalysis, differential fault analysis, DFA, DSTU 7624:2014, fault attack, IFA, ineffective fault analysis, Kalyna, side channel analysis
Cipher,Internet privacy,Block cipher,Cryptography,Computer security,Advanced Encryption Standard,Computer science,Advanced Encryption Standard process,Related-key attack,Triple DES,Differential cryptanalysis
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
26
5
1939-3555
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.35
5
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Onur Duman131.27
Amr Youssef223829.69