Paper Info
Title
Simpler Generic Constructions for Strongly Secure One-round Key Exchange from Weaker Assumptions.
Abstract
In PKC 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced a generic one-round key exchange (ORKE) protocol (which is referred to as BJS) from digital signature (SIG) and simplified non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) without involving any identity. The BJS scheme is shown to satisfy extended Canetti and Krawczyk-PFS security if the NIKE is adaptive-CKS-light secure and the SIG is strongly secure against existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks. However, the BJS scheme cannot be instantiated with NIKE scheme with identity (e.g. the one proposed by Boneh and Zhandry in Crypto 2014). In this paper, we propose a much simpler generic construction for ORKE from NIKE and SIG. In particular, our scheme only makes weaker security assumptions on the underlying building blocks. Namely, we first show that the static-CKS-light security of NIKE, where the target identities are chosen by the adversary before seeing the system parameters, is sufficient for our construction. On the second, we observe that the SIG only needs to provide strong existential unforgeability under weak chosen message attacks for our construction. These results enable our proposal to have more concrete instantiations which might be easier to build and realize. At the same time, our new protocol is much more computationally efficient than the BJS protocol.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1093/comjnl/bxw095
COMPUTER JOURNAL
Keywords
Field
DocType
forward secrecy,one round,key exchange,standard model,non-interactive key exchange,indistinguishability obfuscation
Key exchange,Computer science,Theoretical computer science,Distributed computing
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
60
8
0010-4620
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.42
16
Authors
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
zheng yang1258.02
Junyu Lai262.56
Chao Liu3516.69
Wanping Liu4528.13
Shuangqing Li520.42