Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Dynamic spectrum allocation has been proven as a promising solution to the spectrum scarcity problem. Auctions represent a natural allocation mechanism that generates a monetary remuneration for primary users. We study approximate revenue-maximizing spectrum auctions in a prior-free setting, when information on user valuations on channels is unavailable. A two-phase auction framework is presented.... |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1093/comjnl/bxx022 | The Computer Journal |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
secondary spectrum market,prior-free auctions,truthful bidding,revenue maximization | Mathematical optimization,Revenue maximization,Computer science,Open spectrum,Generalized second-price auction,Theoretical computer science,Auction theory,Auction algorithm,Revenue equivalence | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
60 | 6 | 0010-4620 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.37 | 7 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chen Ying | 1 | 1 | 0.37 |
| Hao Huang | 2 | 5 | 3.13 |
| Ajay Gopinathan | 3 | 82 | 6.89 |
| Zongpeng Li | 4 | 2054 | 153.21 |